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852 PEOPLE v. LININGER. [17 C. (2d) 
the appellant's release from prison he assisted in procuring 
a parole for Jette. Thereafter the appellant went to workon 
the Montana farm where Jette lived with his family. The 
families of the two men discovered their improper relations 
and apparently Jette placed the entire blame on the appellant. 
This and the asserted threat of Jette to commit similar acts 
on' the appellant's wife and stepdaughter, then living in 
Alaska and Texas respectively, were advanced by hiin as the 
motivating force leading to the homicide. He admitted that 
he followed Jette to this state and killed him by placing a 
can of cyanide poison used in exterminating rodents, in his 
cabin. He then :fled but was Soon apprehended. 
The appellant testified at length concerning the circum-
stances surrounding the commission of the crime and in im-
posing sentence the judge said: "In this case the defendant 
is a sexual pervert. He has already killed two men." But 
he also commented at length upon the evidence and stated 
that there were no mitigating circumstances which would 
justify a life sentence. True, he did say: "Life imprison-
ment is practically a joke, fifteen years at the outside." This 
language is unjudicial but there can be no question that it 
was intended to express a view that a life sentence with the 
possibility of parole within a few years was not a sufficient 
punishment for the crime which had been committed. Among 
other things, the judge said that "the ,only argument in his, ' 
favor, that is to say why the death penalty should not be im-
posed, is apparently that he has pleaded guilty and saved the 
county some expense .... There is nothing in the evidence to 
indicate to me that he would Come out cured or any better. He 
would still be of an age when he might commit those acts with 
other people and might take' other people's lives. .'. . " 
It is, therefore, apparent that although the judge was mis-
taken in his statement concerning the previous crime com-
mitted by the appellant, the death sentence was not imposed 
for that reason but because, in his opinion, the evidence did 
not justify punishment by imprisonment for what might be 
a term much less than life. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Traynor, J., Shenk, J., Ourtis, J., and Gibson, C. J., con-
curred. 
OARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of affirmance. 
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[L. A. No. 17365. In Bank.-April 28, 1941.] 
Estate of ELLA M. HENDERSON, Deceased. BESSIE 
PECK"Executrix, etc., Respondent; v. EASTERN STAR 
HOMES OF CALIFORNIA (a Corporation), Appellant; 
LEON McGARY et al., Heirs and Respondents. 
[1] Oharities-n.efinitions-Requisites~Beneficiaries, etc.-What 
are Oharitable Oorporations-Test.-A bequest is charitable 
if: (1) It is made for a charitable purpose; its aims and ac-
complishments are of religious, educational, political or gen-
eral social interest to mankind. (2) The ultimate recipients 
constitute either the community as a whole or an unascertain-
able and indefinite portion thereof. The charitable nature of 
an institution is determined on the same basis. 
[2] Id.-Particular Bequests-Indigent, or Dependent Persons-
Aged-Eastern Star Homes.-A bequest to the Eastern Star 
Homes, Inc., to be used by the trustees in such manner as may 
be most beneficial to the home and its inmates, is for a charita-
ble purpose within Probate Code, sections 41, 43, even though 
[3] 
. indigence is not a requirement for admission. 
Id.-Benefit not to Relieve Poverty.-Relief to poverty is 
not a condition of charitable assistance. If the benefit con-
ferred has a sufficiently widespread social value, a charitable 
purpose exists. The supplying of care and attention to aged 
is as much a charitable purpose as relief of their financial 
wants. 
[4] Evidence - Judicial ' Notice - Applicability of Principles----In 
General-Nonfinancial Oare Required 'by Aged.-It is a mat-
ter, of common knowledge that aged people require 'care and 
attention apart from financial assistance. 
[5] Oharities-Particular Bequests-Indigent or Dependent Per-
son~Payment for Care as F: ~tor.-A bequest to the Eastern 
Star Homes is none the less charitable although upon admis-
sion inmates must assign their assets to the home. A gift or 
trust to support an institution beneficial to the community is 
charitable even though the inmates must pay fees or contribute 
to the expenses of its maintenance, so long as the income de~ 
rived is used only to, maintain theinstitutioil and. for some 
other charitable purpose. 
S. See 5 Oal. Jur. 24; 10 Am. Jur. 621. 
McK. Dig. References: 1,6. Charities, § 1; 2,3,5. Charities, § 19; 
4. Evidence, § 18; ,7. Mutual Benefit Societies, §, 1; 8. Charities, 
§ 25 j 9. Charities, § 10. 
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[6] Id.-Definitions-Requisites_Gifts to Noncharitable Organiza~ 
tion-Support by Assessments as Factor.-The nature of a 
gift to an organization by an outsider as being for charitable 
pUrposes is not necessarily determined by the status of the 
donee; a charitable gift may be made to anoncharitable in-
stitution if the purpose of the gift is charitable. And so 
the fact that "Eastern Star Homes" is supported by an-
nual assessments on members' of the Order of Eastern 
Star does not affect the charitable nature of a bequest to the 
Homes for care of the aged. (Estate of Dol, 182 Cal. 159, 
187 Pac. 428, criticized.) 
[7] Mutual Benefit Societies - Definition, Nature and Object-
Benefits as Matter of Right.-A true mutual benefit association 
is based upon reciprocal contracts and requires that a member 
receive benefits as a matter of 'right. Such an organization is 
distinct from one in which the member receives benefits be-
cause his case is deserving, not because previous contributions 
have given him a contractual right thereto. 
[8] Oharities - Beneficiaries; etc. - Beneficiaries-Oertainty_Re_ 
stricted Admission to Rome.-It is not essential that every 
member of the community be a direct beneficiary of a charita-
ble gift. A charity may be validly restricted to an indefinite 
class· withIn the community so long as the class is large enough 
to make the enforcement of the gift beneficial to the com-
munity. The aged members of the Eastern Star Homes con-
stitute a class of beneficiaries indefinite enough to render a 
bequest for their care charitable. And this is true although 
admission is restricted to members· who have been affiliated 
with the California order for 10 years, and have reached the 
age of 65, where by virtue of restrictions on number of ad-
mittees from each chapter the beneficiaries are indefinite. 
[9] Id.-Restrictions upon Amount of Bequests-In General.--
Probate Code, section 41, restricts the amount of a charitable 
bequest to one-third of the testator's" estate," not the" resi-
due" of the estate. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Thurmond Clarke, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
A~gab:dte & Elver for Appellant. 
Lawrence Edwards and Charles H. Epperson for Respond-
ent Heirs. 
No appearance for Respondent Executrix. 
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TRAYNOR, J.~On September 23, 1937, Ella M. Hender-
son died leaving a will executed on June 11, 1937, which 
provided, for a: specific legacy of $500 to Bessie· M. Peck and 
bequeathed the' residue of the estate to the Eastern Star 
Homes of California ' 'to be used by the trustees in such 
manner as may be most beneficial to the Home and its in-
mates". The will was admitted to probate and Bessie Peck 
was 'appointed executrix of the estate which consists of per-
sonal property appraised at $16,229.04. At the request of 
Leon McGary, a nephew and one of the heirs-at-law of _ de-
ceased, the executrix instituted this proceeding to determine 
which persons were entitled to share in the distribution of 
the estate. The trial court held that the Eastern Star Homes 
was a non-profit charitable organization under sections 41 and 
43 of the Probate Code. These sections provide that a devise 
or bequest to a charitable corporation or to a person in trust 
for charitable uses under a will executed less than six months 
prior to the death of the testator cannot exceed one-third of 
the entire estate if there are surviving heirs who would other-
wise take the excess over one-third. The court concluded that 
Bessie Peck should receive the sum of $500; the ,Eastern Star 
Homes should receive only one-third of the residue of the 
estate; and the nephews, nieces, and other relatives of the 
deceased should receive the other two-thirds of the residue. 
Judgment was entered accordingly. The Eastern Star Homes 
has appealed. 
The respondent executrix has taken the position that she 
is a neutral party and not called upon to contest the 'appeal 
of the Eastern Star Homes. She consequently has filed no 
brief nor made any appearance in opposition to the appeal. 
Certain of the heirs of the deceased, however, to whom dis-
tribution of a portion of the residue of the estate has been 
'ordered, have been granted leave to appear and have filed 
a brief in opposition to that' of appellant. 
The Order of the Eastern Star in the State of California is 
,an unincorporated fraternal organization consisting of ap-
proximately 96,000 members affiliated in 492 subordinate 
chapters located within the state. Membership in the Order 
, is limited to those persons elected by the Order from among 
Master Masons, their wives" and certain other female rela-
tives. In addition to an initiation fee, each member pays 
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annual dues and assessments levied by the Grand Chapter, 
the governing body of the Order in this state, and by the 
local chapter with which the member is affiliated. In 1930 the 
Grand Chapter organized the Eastern Star Homes of' Cali-
fornia, a non-profit corporation and appellant herein, for the 
following purpose: "To own, control, conduct and manage 
homes for the care, maintenance and support of aged, indi-
gent or infirm members of the Order of the Eastern Star". 
Appellant maintains such a home in Los Angeles. The laws 
of the Grand Chapter and the by-laws of the corporation pro-
vide that admission to the Home shall be restricted to mem-
bers of the Order selected by appellant's board of trustees 
who: (1 ) have been nominated by their local chapter; (2) 
have been members in good standing of the Order of the 
Eastern Star in the State of California for not less th[!,n 10 
years; (3) are 65 years of age; and (4) are in reasonably 
good health. Upon admission to the Home each member is 
required to assign all of his assets to the appellant. 
The average yearly cost of operating the Home is $30,000, 
80 per cent of which is derived from annual assessments 
levied by the Grand Chapter upon members of the Order 
and the remaining 20 per cent principally from income on 
investments. Appellant's only other income is $500 a year 
from its endowment' fund. 
If the bequest in question constitutes a gift to a charitable 
institution or a gift in trust for charitable uses, it is invalid 
to the extent that it exceeds the one-third limitation imposed 
by section 41 of the Probate Code, the will having been 
executed within six months prior to the death of the testatrix. 
The present bequest sets up a trust for the benefit of the 
inmates of the Home. It is made to the Eastern Star Homes, 
Inc., "to be used by the trustees in· such manner as may be 
most beneficial to the Home and its inmates". Thus, the 
trustees, the beneficiaries, and the trust purpose are all stated. 
Such bequests, even though made directly to an association, 
are generally construed to constitute trusts' for the benefit of 
the inmates if the bequests are charitable in nature. (Estate 
of McDole, 215 Cal. 328 [10 Pac. (2d) 75]; Estate of De 
Mars, 20 Cal. App. (2d) 514 [67 Pac. (2d) 374]; Estate of 
McCray, 204 Cal. 399 [268 Pac. 647] ; Estate of Upham, 127 
Cal. 90 [59 Pac. 315]1 Rest., Trusts, sec. 397 (f).) 
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[1] A bequest is charitable if: (1) It is made for a 
charitable purpose; its aims and accomplishments are of re-
ligious, educational, political or general social interest to 
mankind. (People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129 [45 Pac. 270, 
35 L. R. A. 269] ; Estate of Merchant, 143 Cal. 537 [77 Pae. 
475].) (2) The ultimate recipients constitute either the 
community as a whole or an unascertainable and indefinite 
portion thereof. (People v. Cogsioell, supra; Estate of Hinck-
ley,58 Cal. 457; Fay v. Howe, 136 Cal. 599 [69 Pac. 423].) 
The charitable nature of an institution is determined on the 
same basis. 
[2-4] The bequest in the present case was clearly made 
for a charitable 'purpose. Since the enactment of the Statute 
of Charitable Uses during the reign of Elizabeth, aid to the 
aged and infirm has been recognized as charitable. (See 
cases cited in 5 Cal. Jur. 24.) Relief of poverty is not a 
condition of charitable assistance. If the benefit conferred 
has a sufficiently widespread social value, a charitable purpose 
exists. (Rest., Trusts, secs. 368, 374; People v. Cogswell, 
supra; Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641 [266 Pac. 526]; 16 
Cal. Law Rev. 478.) Thus, gifts or trusts for educational 
institutions (Rest., Trusts, sec. 370; People v. Cogswell, 
supra), the ,promotion of woman's suffrage (Garrison v. Little, 
75 Ill. App. 402), the publishing of religious writings (Rest., 
Trusts, sec. 371; Estate of Graham, 63 Cal. App. 41 [218 Pac. 
84] ; see 16 Cal. Law Rev. 478 at 482), and even for the relief 
of. dumb animals (Estate' of Coleman, 167 Cal. 212 [138 Pac. 
992, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 682]; Rest., Trusts, sec. 374 (c) ), 
have been held charitable. It is a matter of common knowl-
edge that aged people require care and attention apart from 
financial assistance, and the supply of this care and atten~ 
tion is as much a charitable and benevolent purpose as the 
relief of their financial wants. Every civilized community 
must provide facilities, either public or private, for the care 
of old people regardless of financial condition, and a bequest 
to such an institution to further its purposes is of enough 
social value to be designated as charitable. (See Estate of 
Friedma'n, 171 Cal. 431 [153 Pac. 918] ; Estate of Peabody, 
154 Cal. 173 [97 Pac. 184]; Rest., Trusts, secs. 368-374.) 
The articles of incorporation of appellant Home indicate 
that it was created for the purpose of rendering assistance 
to the deserving aged. A bequest to it may therefore be' 
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charitable even though indigence is not a requirement for 
admission. 
[5] Appellant points out that upon admission an inmate 
must assign his assets to the Home. The value of such an as-
signment is not necessarily commensurate with the benefits 
derived by him from the Home. But even if each inmate were 
required to pay in full for his care, a bequest to the institution 
may still be charitable. A gift or trust to support an in-
stitution beneficial to. the community is charitable even though 
the inmates must pay fees or contribute to the expense of 
maintaining the institution so long as the income thus derived 
is used only to maintain the institution or for some other 
charitable purpose. (Rest., Trusts, sec. 376 (c); Dingwell 
v. Seymour, 91 Cal. App. 483 [267 Pac. 327] ; Estate of Pea-
body, 154 Cal. 173. [97 Pac. 184].) Thus students at a 
private school may be required to pay tuition fees to cover 
the cost of their instruction; yet a gift to such a school for 
the purpose of assisting in the education of· its students is 
clearly charitable.· (Estate of Bailey, 19 'Cal. App. (2d) 
135 [65 Pac. (2d) 102]; People v. Oogswell, supra; Estate 
of Bartlett, 122 Cal. App. 375 [10 Pac. (2d) 126]; Rest., 
Trusts, sec. 370.) Appellant cites a number of decisions 
denying a charitable status to fraternal orders, lodges, ·and 
kindred organizations. (Bangor v. Rising Virtue etc. Ma-
sonic Lodge, 73 Me. 428 [40 Am. Rep. 369] ; Mason v. Perry, 
22 R. I. 475 [48 At!. 671] ; Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle (Pa.), 151 
[28 Am. Doc. 650].) These cases have rio bearing on the 
present one. The gift here is not to the Order of the Eastern 
Star but to the Eastern Star Homes, Inc., a corporation de-
voted exclusively to caring for the aged, and it is not a gen-
eral fraternal contribution but was made expressly for the 
charitable purpose of aiding the aged. 
[6] The support of the Home by annual assessments on 
members of the Order of the Eastern Star likewise does not 
destroy the charitable nature of the bequest. Appellant cites 
Estate of Dol, 182 Cal. 159 [187 Pac. 428] , Brown v. La 
Societe Francaise, etc., 138 Cal. 475 [71 Pac. 516] , and Gor-
man v. Russell, 14 Cal. 531, f.or the proposition that a mutual 
benefit society, each member of which pays. fixed periodic 
sums into a common fund which is used to render medical or 
other assistance to any member in need thereof, does not con-
stitute· a charitable organization. Appellant contends that 
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it is just such a non-charitable mutual benefit society or-
ganized for the protection of the members of the Order of the 
Eastern Star and that a bequest to it is therefore not charita-
ble. Appellant, however, overlooks the fact that the nature 
of the bequest is not necessarily determined by the status of 
the organization to which it is made. A charitable gift may. 
be made to a non-charitable institution so long as the purpose 
of the gift remains charitable. (Estate of Willey, 128 Cal. 
1 [60 Pac~ 471] ; Powers v. Home for Aged Women, 58 R. I. 
323 [192 AtL 770, 110 A. L. R. 1361].) The cases of Gorman 
v. Russell and Brown v. La Societe Francaise, etc., were con-
cerned solely with the charitable or non-charitable status of 
certain organizations and not with the question of whether.a 
gift to such organizations by an outsider might be a charitable 
one. In the Gorman case a group of longshoremen formed a 
society, each member of which contributed to a common fund 
which was used to assist members who became sick or disabled. 
Certain individuals who were expelled from the organization 
brought suit for dissolution and distribution of the funds, 
claiming the organization was no more than a private part-
nership.. The defendants contended the society was a charita-
ble one and that therefore the funds belonged not to the 
individual members but to the ultimate beneficiaries. The 
court held the organization to be non-charitable. In the 
Brown case a patient who was negligently treated in a hospi-
tal maintained by a mutual benefit society for the assistance 
of its members brought suit against the hospital. The hos:" 
pital contended that it was a charitable institution and there-
fore not liable under the rule of respondeat superior for the 
negligent acts of its servants. The court held it to be non-
charitable. In Estate of Dol the question was squarely pre4 
sented whether a bequest to a mutual benefit society organized 
to render medical aid· to its members was charitable. The 
court, however, held on· the basis of the Brown and Gorman 
cases that the bequest was not charitable because the organi-
zation itself was not a charitable one. It failed to consider 
in any way whether the gift was charitable in nature despite 
the status of the organization, overlooking the fact that the 
Brown and Gorman cases on which it relied were not at all 
concerned with the charitable nature of gifts. 
If a group of individuals agree to contribute equal amounts 
into a fund to be used for the benefit of all, such a group may 
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well be said to be non-charitable in nature because each indi-
vidual is providing only for his own welfare and does not 
intend to make a free contribution toward the assistance of 
others. If an outsider, however, receiving no benefits from 
the organization, makes a gift to it, that gift. may well be a 
charitable· one if the members of the organization are suffi-
ciently numerous and it is organized for a purpose beneficial 
to society such as providing for medical assistance to its mem- ' 
bers. Such a donor has the charitable purpose of assisting 
those members of a large group who become sick, without any 
benefit to himself, and the gift thus may be a charitable one. 
In the present case, therefore, even if the Home itself be 
considered in the nature of a mutual benefit society and hence 
non-charitable, the bequest to the Home, being for the pur-
pose of aiding the aged, may remain charitable. 
[7] A true mutual benefit aS8ociation, however, is based 
upon reciprocal contracts and requires that a member receive 
benefits as a matter of right. Members of the Order of the 
Eastern Star who pay their required assessments acquire no 
right, contractual or otherwise, to be admitted to the Home, 
even after fulfilling the entrance requirements. A member 
must be nominated by his local chapter and selected by the 
trustees of the Home before he can gain admittance, and only 
one member out of every 500 in a local chapter can acquire 
residence in the Home' at the same time. A member is ad-
mitted to the Home because his case is deserving and not be-
cause his previous contributions have given him a contractual 
right to admission. Thus, there is a clear distinction between 
this type of organization which has a charitable purpose and 
a mutual benefit society. Many decisions sustain the charita-
ble nature of institutions established to render aid to the 
members thereof -who need assistance even though the in-
stitutions are supported by contributions from the members. 
(Spiller v. Maude, 32 Oh. D. 158 (1881); Pease v. Pattison, 
32 Oh. D. 154 (1886); In re Buck, 2 Oh. 727 (1896); In re 
Lacy, 2. Ch. 149 (1899); Morrow v. Smith (Re Wilson),145 
Iowa 514 [124 N. W. 316, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1188, 26 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 696]; Plattsmouth Lodge, etc., v. Cass County, 79 
Neb. 463 [113 N. W. 167.]; De la Pole v. Broughton, 118 
Wash. 395 [204 Pac. 15] ; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees,. vol. 2, 
pp. 1122-1126; Rest., Trusts, sec. 369.) The bequest to ap-
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pellant was therefore made for a charitable purpose and to 
an institution with a charitable purpose. 
[8] There remains the question whether the aged mem-
bers of the Order for whose welfare the Home was established 
constitute a class of beneficiaries indefinite enough to render 
the bequest or the institution to which it was made charitable. 
It is not essential that every member. of the community be a 
direct beneficiary of a charitable gift. .A charity may be 
validly :restricted to an indefinite class within the community 
so long as the class is large enough to make the enforcement 
of the gift beneficial to the community. (Rest., Trusts, sec. 
375.) In the case of bequests for the relief of poverty, 
or the advancement of education, or religion, or the promo-
tion of health, inclusive of the care of the aged, the number 
of beneficiaries need not be so large as when the gift is' simply 
for the gelleral benefit of a class without indication of the 
particular purpose fo-r which it is to be used. (Rest., Trusts, 
sec. 375 (a).) . Thus gifts and trusts to eleemosynary in-
stitutions whose benefits are restricted to members in a par-
ticular organization have been held charitable. (Estate of 
Halm, 196 Cal. 778 [239 Pac. 307] ; Estate of Bailey, 19 Cal. 
App. (2d) 135 [65 Pac. (2d) 102]; Spiller v. Maude, 32 Oh. 
D. 158 (1881); Pease v. Pattinson, 320h. D. 154 (1886); 
In re Buck, 2 Oh. 727 (1896) ; In re Lacy, 2 Oh. 149 (1899); 
City of IndianapoUs v. Grand Master, 25 Ind. 518; Duke v. 
Fuller, 9 N. H. 536 [32 Am. Dec. 392] ; Morrow v. Smith (Re 
Wilson), supra; Most Worshipful Grand Lodge v. Board of 
Review, 281 Ill. 480 [117 N. E. 1016]; Roberts v. Corson, 
.79 N. H. 215 [107 Atl. 625]; State v. Toney, 141 Or. 406 
[17 Pac. (2d) 1105] ; Masonic Education and Charity Trust 
v. City of Boston, 201 Mass. 320, [87 N. E. 602] ,; City of 
Petersburg v. Petersburg Benevolent Mechanics' Assn., -78 
Va. 431; De la Pole v. Broughton, supra; Scott on Trusts, 
vol. 2, pp. 2022-2028; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, vol. 2, 
pp. 1106, 1107; Rest., Trusts, 369.) Gifts and trusts de-
signed to aid the poor, the aged, and the unfortunate have 
been sustained as charitable although the beneficiaries are 
limited to the widows and orphans of thedeceasedmem-
bers of particular organizations, including fraternal' or-
ders. (Estate of Willey, 128 Oal. 1 [60 Pac. 471]; Es-
tate of Upham, 127 Oal.90 [59 Pac. 315]; Guilfm'lv. 
Arthur, 158 Ill. 600 (41 N. E. 1009]; Wido'ws and Orphans 
862 ESTATE OF HENDERSON. [17 C. (2d) 
Home, 'etc., v. Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 386 [103 S. W. 354, 16 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 829]; Duke v. Fuller, 9 N. H. 536. [32 Am. 
Dec. 392]; Heiskell v. Chickasaw Lodge, 87 Tenn. 668 [11 
S. W. 825, 4 L. R. A. 699] ; City of Petersburg v. Petersburg 
Benevolent Mechanics' Assn., 78 Va. 431; De la Pole v. 
Broughton, 118 Wash. 395 [204 Pac. 15]~) 
Appellant points out that· admission to the Home is re-
stricted to members of the Eastern Star who have been 
affiliated with the California Order for 10 years and have 
reached the age of 65 years and contends therefore that the 
number of beneficiaries is definitely fixed since their identity 
can be ascertained by an examination of the Order rolls. This 
argument assumes that the Home exists solely for the benefit 
of members who are at present able to fulfill the requ.irements 
for admission. The Order of the Eastern Star, however, is a 
constantly changing group. The Home exists not only for 
the benefit of members now eligible for admission but also 
for the benefit of members who at present lack the entrance 
qualifications and persons who will join the Order in the 
future. An inspection of the records therefore will not dis-
close all of the class to be benefited. In addition, appellant's 
articles of incorporation limit each local chapter to one resi-
dent in the Home for each 500 members in the Chapter. This 
restriction operates to exclude from the Home many members 
possessing t~e required qualifications for admission and ren-
ders the beneficiaries even more indefinite. 
[9] Section 41 of the Probate Code restricts the amount of 
. a charitable bequest to one-third of the testator's estate. The 
trial court in the present case restricted the amount of the 
bequest to appellant to one-third of the residue of the testa-
tor's estate. The judgment is reversed and the cause is re-
manded to the trial court with instructions to modify its 
decree by awarding to appellant an amount equal toone-third 
of the testator's estate, neither party to recover costs on ap-
peal. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
CURTIS, J., Dissenting.-I dissent. 
From the findings of the court it appears that the Eastern 
Star Homes was organized as a non-profit corporation under 
the provisions of section 593 of the Civil Code by the Grand 
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Chapter of the State of California of the Order of Eastern 
Star. Its articles of incorporation state that the purpose of 
its organization is "to own, control, conduct and manage 
homes, hospitals and asylums for the care, maintenance and 
support of aged, indigent or infirm members of the Order of 
the Eastern Star". The by-laws of the corporation restrict 
admission to the IIome to members of the Order of the Eastern 
Star who have been in good standing for not less than ten 
years. The Home is maintained and supported by dues and 
assessments levied against members of said Order. No person 
not a member of said Order has ever been admitted as a 
resident of said Home. It thus appears that only those per-
sons who have contributed toward the support of said IIome 
for a long period of time are entitled to the privileges of said 
IIome, and such contributions are practically the sole sup-
port of the Home. Is such an organization a charitable· or 
benevolent society or corporation within the meaning and 
intent of section 41 of the Probate Code? 
In the case of Brown v. La Societe Francaise, etc., 138 Cal. 
475 [71 Pac; 516], the question before the court was whether 
or not the defendant was a charitable institution. In passing 
upon that question, the court held· that it was not such an 
organization and, for reason of so holding, stated at page 477: 
"From the by-laws of the defendant, of date May 10, 1854, 
it appears that the society was originally organized as a vol-
untary association, but was afterwards incorporated by the 
filing of a certificate of· election of trustees,June 7, 1854 
(Hittell's Gen. Laws, art. 1024) ; and on May 5, 1895, new 
by-laws were adopted. From these it appears that 'the 
society is established on the basis of mutuality for .the treat-
ment of sick members, ' or, as more specifically provided, for 
the purpose of s~curing to its members (without payment 
otherwise than of dues ) medical and surgical treatment, in-
cluding the services of its physicians, surgeons, apothecaries, 
dentists, nurses, etc., and also medicines. Nor do we find in 
it any provision for assistance to others, except to paying 
patients, or sick persons not members admitted to treatment 
for agreed compensation. It is therefore merely an associa-
tion for mutual profit or benefit, similar in its essential nature 
. to other societies formed for such purposes. (Gorman v. 
Russell, 14 Cal. 531 ;18 CaL 688; Donnelly v. Boston Catholic 
Cemetery, 146 Mass. 166; Ooe v. Washington Mills, 149 Mass. 
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547; Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle, 151 [28 Am. Dec. 650] ; Texas 
and Pac. Coal Co. v. Connaughton [Connaughten], 20 Tex. 
eiv. App. 642 [50 S. W. 173].)" 
In the Estate of Dol, 182 Cal. 159 [187 Pac. 428], an appeal 
was taken from an order distributing the sum of $5,000 to a 
hospital located in Los Angeles, and the name of which and 
the purpose of its organization were practically the same as, 
those of the defendant in the Brown case. The court held that 
the two organizations were so similar that the later case was 
controlled by the decision in the earlier case, that the respond-
ent in the case then before the court was not a charitable or 
benevolent society or corporation as these terms were used in 
section 1313 of the Civil Code (now in part re-enacted in sec-
tion 41 of the Probate Code), and that the bequest to it was 
not limited by the provisions of said section of the code. In 
the discussion of the question of the charitable character of 
the defendant therein, Mr. Justice Shaw at page 163 of the 
Estate of Dol expressed the view of the court as follows: 
" ... The same principle is stated in Gorman v. Russell, 
14 Cal. 531. Referring to an organization known as the 
'Riggers and Stevedores Union Association of San Francisco,' 
which was unincorporated, the court said that it was a'volun-
tary associa.tion formed for the benefit of the members of it,' 
and further, that 'a number of the members of a particular 
avocation meet for mutual benefit and protection and pre-
scribe rules for the government of the society thus organized. 
They agree that each shall contribute a certain fixed sum to 
the common treasury, and that the sum shall be applied, in 
a certain event, as in sickness, etc., to the relief of the neces-
sities or wants of the individual members or of their families. 
This is not a charity 'any more than an assurance society 
against fire, or upon life, is a charity. It is simply a fair and 
reciprocal contract among the members to pay certain amounts 
in certain contingencies, to each other, out, of a common fund. ' 
The fact that the society there involved was unincorporated 
makes no essential difference. The members of the corpora-
tion here involved are interested therein substantially in the 
same way as the members of a voluntary association or part-
nership formed for the same object are interested. No sound 
distinction exists on this ground. In each case the arrange-
ment partakes of the nature of a contract whereby, for the 
dues and fees agreed upon and paid, the members receive 
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the medical treatment to be given by the association at the 
expense of the common fund thus accumulated. Such a so-
ciety, whether incorporated or not, is not doing charitable 
work, but is merely rendering the consideration agreed upon 
in the contract between it and its members. " 
The Estate of Dol was again before this court. On the 
second occasion the question before the court was whether the 
Los Angeles County Pioneer Society was a charitable society, 
as that term was used in section 1313 of the Civil Code. That 
society was organized for the purpose of. the collection and 
preservation of data touching the early history of the state. 
This court held: "Weare of the opinion that 'the respondent 
is a charitable and benevolent corporation. If its only object 
were to cultivate social intercourse and friendship among its 
members, it would be for the benefit of the members alone 
and it would not come Within that class. But it is apparent 
from the reading of the part of the articles (of incorporation) 
above quoted that this was but a minor part of its purposes." 
(186 Cal. 64, 65 [198 Pac. 1039].) 
It might be well to call attention again to the purpose -for 
which the appellant, the Eastern Star Homes, was organized, 
which is to maintain a home exclusively for its own members. 
No person other than a member of the Order in good stand-
ing could enjoy the privileges of the Home, which was main-
tained and supported by dues and assessments paid by these 
members. 
No legal distinction may be made respecting their chari-
table' character between an institution founded and main-
tained by a society or corporation for the purpose of pro-
viding a home for its needy members and a hospital founded 
and maintained for the purpose of caring for its sick or in-
jured members, where each institution is supported and main-
tained by dues and assessments levied upon and paid by its 
members. In each case those enjoying the privileges of the 
home or hospital have paid for all the privileges and bene-
fits received by them. In neither case does any member of 
either of such institutions, enjoying the privileges and bene-
fits of the society of which he is a member, receive anything 
fDl' which he has not paid a stipulated consideration. In 
the case of a member of the Order of the Eastern Star, before 
she can be entitled to the benefit of the Home maintained 
by that Order, she must have been a member of the Order for 
U o. (.Sd)--.28 
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ten years and be in good standing at the time of making 
her application for admission. That means that for that pe~ 
riod of time she has contributed toward the support of the 
Home all dues and assessments levied by the Order. To say 
that the Home is a charitable society or corporation when its 
benefits and privileges are limited solely to the members of 
the Order who have con:tributed definite and fixed amounts 
for its maintenance and support, is contrary to all reason· 
able or legal definitions of the word "charity". The decisions 
above cited are contrary to any such construction and clearly 
support the cbntention of appellant that the Eastern Star 
Homes is not a charitable or benevolent society or corpora-
tion within the provisions. of section 41 of the Probate Code. 
H Such a society," quoting from the case of Gorman v. Rus-
sell, supra, and approved and applied by this court in the 
Estate of Dol, supra, "whether incorporated or not, is not 
doing charitable work, but is merely rendering the considera-
tion agreed upon in the contract between it and its mem-
bers." 
The respondents have cited in their brief some thirty cases 
decided either by this court or by the District Courts of Ap-
peal, which they argue support their contention that the ap-
pellant is a charitable or benevolent society or corporation. 
A mere reading of these cases ,discloses. that not one of them 
involves a society or co~poration whose benefits and privileges 
are limited only to the paying m-embers of such organization. 
It is useless to discuss these cases in any detail for the 
reason that they are so wide of the mark that their inappli. 
cability is apparent from. simply mentioning the name and 
purpose of the particular organization to which the gift was 
made. In one case, Estate of F'ried'1'fW,n, 171 Cal. 431 [153 
Pac. 918], the bequest was made to the Hebrew Home for 
Aged Disabled of San Francisco. It is not clear that this 
Home was ever limited even to the Jewish people, but it does 
plainly appear that the privileges of this Home were not 
limited to the members of that group who contributed to the 
maintenance of the Home, like those members of the hospi-
tal in the Dol case were doing. A number of these cases 
involved gifts to educational institutions, which clearly have 
no application to the question before US in the present pro-
ceeding. In other caseS the question before the court con-
cerned bequests to churches and other religious o:rganizations. 
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As churches and religious organizations are invariably held 
to be charitable socIeties, the court in these last named cases. 
held, in accordance with this well-established rule, that such, 
bequests were charitable within. the terms of, section 1313 of 
the Civil Code. The Estate of Burns, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 741 
[80 Pac. (2d) 77], is also cited, but for what purpose we 
are unable to determine. While the will under contest in 
that case provided for a bequest to the Hollenbeck Home, a , 
charitable institution, the sole question before the court in 
that case was whether the evidence of the contestants estab· 
lished a prima facie case of undue influence on the part of 
certain beneficiaries named in the will. This court held 
that it was insufficient and affirmed the judgment of nonsuit. 
It is unnecessary to consider any of the other cited cases, 
as those not discussed above have no more bearing upon this 
present proceeding than those we have considered. 
The rule approved by the decisions of this state cited and 
relied upon above is the general accepted doctrine in other 
jurisdictions. In Zollmann on, Charities at section 206, it is 
stated: "Mutual benefit societies exist in great numbers and, 
as their name indicates, are of much benefit to their members. 
... Since their benevolence begins and ends at home, they 
will not receive recognition as charities ... " The author 
in section 208 of the same work in discussing the status of 
lodges, stated: "On reason lodges are not charities within 
the meaning of the statute of Elizabeth. . . . They. are bodies 
,which derive their funds not from gifts, testamentary or 
otherwise, but from dues, fees and assessments, and which 
have other objects. than charity, and are rather mutual bene-
fit associations than charitable institutions .... A lodge of 
Odd Fellows is, therefore, a mutual benefit society rather 
than a charity. " 
A leading case upon this subject is Bangor v. Rising Virtue 
etc. Masonic Lodge, 73 Me .. 428 [40 Am. Rep. 369], in which 
the question before the court was whether a Mas.onic lodge 
was a charitable institution. After an extended review of the 
authorities upon the subject and an analysis of the consti-
tution, by.laws, and rules and regulations of Masonic lodges, 
the court held that such a lodge was not a charitable insti. 
tution. On page 436 of the opinion the court states its con. 
clusion as follows: " ... Its funds are derived ... from 
fees and the asses.sments of its members. The funds so ob~ 
tained are to be distributed among the poor and needy mem-
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bers, from whom they were collected, and among their wives 
and children. It is an association for the mutual benefit of 
its members, and not a charitable institution within the mean-
ing of the statute." The statute just referred to provided 
that all real and personal property of all benevolent and chari-
table institutions incorporated in that state should be exempt 
from taxation. The court held that as the lodge was not a 
charitable or benevolent institution, it was not ex-empt from 
taxation under said statute. 
Among the cases cited and relied upon in Bangor v. Ma-
sonic Lodge, su,pra, was the case of Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle 
(Pa.), 151, 157 [28 Am. Dec. 650], wherein the charitable 
character of an Odd Fellows lodge was at issue. In comment-
ing oil that case the Supreme Court of Maine in the above de-
cision (p. 436) observed: "In Babb v. Reed, 5 Rawle [151] 
157 [28 Am. Dec. 650], it was held that alodge of Odd Fel-
lows, being an association of mutual benevolence among its 
members, was not a charitable institution .... 'The associa-
tion,' observes Sargent, J., in delivering the opinion of the 
court, 'from whose property is the money in court, was formed 
and conducted without incorporation. Its objects are stated 
to be the employment of its funds in purposes of mutual 
benevolence among its members and their families; but these 
cannot be deemed charitable uses under the common law of 
Pennsylvania, or the statute 43 Eliz.. . . '" 
Respondents contend that a later case of the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia v. Masonic lIome, 160 Pa. 572 
[28 Atl. 954, 40 Am. St. Rep. 736, 23 L. R . .A. 545], lays 
down a different rule and is in conflict with the earlier case 
of Babb v. Reed, supra, but such is not the case. The Con-
stitution of the State of Pennsylvania provided that property 
of an "institution of purely public charity" was exempt 
from taxation. The court in Philadelphia v. Masonic Home, 
sttpra, simply held that the Masonic home, maintained by the 
Grand Lodge of Masons of the ,State of Pennsylvania, was 
not such an institution, as the" benefits of the Home were 
limited to members of the Masonic fraternity and were not 
open to the public. 
In the case of In re Rathbone's Estate, 170 Misc. 1030 [11 
N. Y. Supp. (2d) 506, ,at p. 529], is to be found a clear 
statement as to the distinction between a beneficial and a 
charitable society. It is there said: "The distinction be-
____________ ' ',11.._ 
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tween a beneficial and a charitable society is clear. In the 
beneficial society the world outside the association's doors 
is essentially a stranger. The beneficial society is regardful 
only of its members. It constitutes a group of insiders. Its 
membership is formed of candidates able to satisfy onerous 
conditions-financial, moral, civil, etc. The members have 
been drawn together by a mutual desire to be as they are. 
Once assembled they exclude all other persons from their so-
ciety activities. The charitable institution is ex'actly the op-
posite in all the stated particulars allowing of comparison. 
To a charity the world outside is a world, the inhabitants of 
which should all be united as brothers. . . . The managing 
members of a charitable organization expect to get nothing for 
their labors. Charity seeks primarily the good of others .... 
Charity is the proof of the profound paradox that to get 
one must give but the giving m'U.St not be for the purpose of 
getting. Every charitable use is open to the whole world 
so far as is practicable." 
As the appellant, the Eastern Star Homes, was founded 
and is maintained for the express and sole purpose of pro-
viding a home for the members of the Order of the Eastern 
Star of this state, and as the funds necessary 'for its opera-
tion and maintenance were contributed by the members of 
said Order in regular dues and assessments, under the above 
authorities it cannot be held to be a charitable or benevolent 
corporation or society,but is, on the other' hand, a mutual 
benefit association, rendering to its members benefits for an 
agreed consideration under a contract between itself and its 
members. 
The respondents further contend that even though the ap-
pellant is not a charitable or benevolent society or corpora-
tion, that the bequest to it is for a charitable purpose and 
therefore comes within the limitation placed on gifts of that 
eharacter by the provisions of section 41 of the Probate Code. 
In support of'this contention they cite the case of Estate of 
Willey, 128 Cal. 1 [60 Pac. 471]. In that case it was con-
tended_ that certain gifts to several Masonic bodies were in-
valid because these bodies were charitable societies. The 
court held that even if these Masonic bodies were not chari-
table societies" the gifts to them were for charitable purposes 
and sustained them. This decisi()n, therefore, properly may 
be construed as holding that a gift or bequest may be chari-
table and therefore subject to the limitation placed on such 
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gifts by section 41 of the Probate Gode, although the person 
or society to whom the gift or bequest is made may not be a 
charitable society. 
As already stated, the bequest to the Eastern Star Homes 
was made "to be used by the trustees in such manner as 
may be most beneficial for t~e Home and its inmates". It 
is presumed that the trustees will properly apply the fund 
so bequeathed to them in accordance with the terms imposed 
by the testatrix. (Estate of Wt1ley, supra, p. 12.) If so, 
the proceeds from the gift will be applied in accordance with 
the purposes of the society, as set forth in its articles of 
incorporation, which we have seen are "to maintain the Home 
for the members of the Order". As the purposes of the 
Order of the Eastern Star are not charitable and the bequest 
from the testatrix was to carry out these purposes, it cannot 
be said that the bequest took on any of the characteristics 
of a charitable nature. Had the bequest been made to the 
Home for the care and maintenance of the children of the 
members of the Order, rather than for the benefit of the 
members, then there might be some legal grounds for hold-
ing it to be a gift in trust for charitable purposes, and the 
case would be brought within the rule announced in the Es-
tate of Willey, supra, where the bequest was made to certain 
Masonic bodies "for the use of the widows'· and orphans' 
fund of said" lodges. But it was not so made and, as made, 
the only persons to be benefited by the gift were the members 
of the Order who might at some time in their lives become 
residents in the Home. 
The accepted definition in this state of a charitable trust 
is " ... a donation in trust for promoting the welfare of 
mankind at large, or of a community, or of some class form-
ing a part of it, indefinite as to numbers and individuals." 
(People v. Oogswell, 113 Cal. 129 [45 Pac. 270, 35 L. R. A. 
269] ; Zollmann on Trusts, p. 140; 5 Cal. Jur. 6.) 
The bequest here involved does not come within· the terms 
of this definition. It was not a donation for promoting the 
welfare of mankind at large, or of any community or class 
indefinite in number. On the other hand, its purpose was to 
promote the welfare of a class of individuals definite in num-
ber; that is, the membership of the Order of the Eastern 
Star of the state. As no member of the Order is entitled to 
become a resident of the Home without sh~ is in good stand-
ing in the Order and has been such for ten years prior to her 
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admission, the· number of individuals whose wel£arethe be-
quest was designed to promote was definitely fixed, and their 
.identity could be ascertained by an inspection of the records 
of the Order. The bequest, therefore, was not a gift to the 
Home for charitable uses, as the. members of the Order for 
whose welfare the. gift was made were an ascertainable and 
definite class of beneficiaries. (Zollmann on Trusts, p. 141; 
Loch v. Mayer, 50 Misc. 442 [100 N. Y. StIpp. 837, 839].) 
I have stated in a preceding part of this opinion that prac-
tically the sole support 9f the Eastern Star Homes came from 
the annual dues and assessments levied against the members 
of the Order of the Eastern Star in this state. The facts 
respecting the maintenance and operation of the Home are 
that the annual cost of such maintenance and operation of 
the Home is $30,000. Approximately $24,000 of this amount 
is from annual dues and assessments levied by the Order on 
its members, and the balance of said annual cost of main-
tenance, except the sum of $500, is from income on invest-
ments made by the corporation from the surplus of previous 
dues and assessments. Said sum of $500 per annum, the court 
Iound, is income "from an endowment fund of the corpora-
tion' '. Respondents state that endowment suggests charity. 
Admitting that the possession of a substantial endowment 
fund is frequently taken into consideration in determining 
the charitable character of an institution possessing such a 
fund, we have been cited to no instance where the income from 
an endowment fund so insignificant in comparison to the total 
upkeep of the institution, as is the endowment income in the 
present case, has ever been. seriously considered in determin-
ingwhether such an institution is a charitable society. Here 
the annual income from the endowment fund is less than 
2 per cent of the annual cost of maintaining the Home, and 
it cannot have the effect of determining the charitable char-
acter of the Home when the purposes of the Home and the 
actual operation thereof indicate its non-charitable character. 
Respondents call our attention to the by-laws of the cor-
poration, the Eastern Star Homes, where in four instances 
reference is made to the corporation as a "charity," and 
contend that it is bound by such an interpretation of itself. 
There is no merit in this contention. No authority is cited 
.in support of this assertion of respondents, and we doubt 
whether any can be found. On the other hand, the contrary 
rule is followed in this state. (Stewart v. Oalifornia Medical 
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etc. Assn., 178 Cal. 418, 421, 422 [176 Pac. 46] ; Stonaker v. 
Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App. 375, 378 [2 Pac. (2d) 
520].) It would be an easy matter in those states where 
charitable societies are exempt from certain taxes, for a cor~ 
poration organized for purely commercial purposes, to escape 
taxation by stating in its articles of incorporation or in its 
by-laws that its purposes were. benevolent and that it was a 
charitable society, if respondents' construction of the· law 
should be accepted. 
I have referred to the heirs of said deceased who have 
appeared herein by filing a brief in opposition to this appeal 
as the respondents. 
For the foregoing reasons in my opinion the judgment 
should be reversed. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
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